United States
A market thrown into reverse: a federal leasing pause and a wave of contract cancellations have stalled what was a fast-emerging pipeline.
Assessment
as of 2026-09-09Emerging. The first commercial-scale US arrays (the South Fork / Vineyard Wind generation) energised only in 2023–24, and operational capacity remains small relative to a once-large pipeline. The market is structurally unusual: BOEM runs federal seabed lease sales while individual states (New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and others) run their own offtake solicitations — two separate gates that must both clear.
Stalled. After a rapid 2021–22 build-up, the market reversed: roughly 70% of awarded state offtake has been de-awarded or repriced as developers walked from contracts struck before the 2022–23 cost spike, and in 2025 the federal government suspended new offshore leasing and moved against permitted projects. Several projects are paused or cancelled; the under-construction set is thin and at risk.
High — the defining feature of the market today. Hafrok believes no federal route to build exists, expects none before January 2029, and dates nothing pre-construction before then. The evidence behind that reading: between March and August 2026 the Department of the Interior bought back twelve offshore wind leases from five developer groups for about $3.9 billion, refunding lease fees against reinvestment in oil, gas and LNG — TotalEnergies, Ocean Winds (Bluepoint and Golden State), Duke, Invenergy and RWE, which relinquished three leases saying "there is no path forward to permit these projects in the U.S. for the foreseeable future". The approvals that survived are being unwound by the agency that issued them: SouthCoast's was remanded at BOEM's own request in November 2025, Atlantic Shores' is under review, and BOEM has joined Ocean City's suit against its own approval of US Wind. The blanket pause was struck down in December 2025, so this happens case by case. State-level demand (NY/NJ/MA mandates) remains, but a project needs both the federal gate and a state offtake, and only the federal gate is closed.
Negative. On that evidence Hafrok's reading is that the route stays closed until at least the earliest a new federal administration can take office, January 2029, and it counts every consent, lease and held project from there. The year is a judgment, labelled as one in the forecast parameters, and a reader may reasonably hold a different one; the buybacks and remands are the facts it rests on. Projects already building are unaffected. The chance of delivery for everything else is halved while Hafrok reads the route as closed. The investable thesis rests on whether state demand survives until a federal posture that issues approvals returns.
Hafrok believes no federal route to build exists today and expects none before January 2029: five lease buybacks in 2026 and BOEM unwinding its own approvals. Nothing pre-construction is dated before then.
- RWE · 2026-08-06 · verified
- US Department of the Interior · 2026-03-23 · verified
- Hafrok · 2026-06 · verified
- BOEM · 2026 · moderate
State of the market
as of 2026-09-09Teal line = the Hafrok Expected Buildout (confidence-weighted): 26 GW of live pipeline weights to 7.9 GW expected to complete, timed by each project's COD distribution (mass beyond 2037 not drawn). Bands are the unweighted dated pipeline — the Expected Buildout also models on-hold and undated projects, so it can sit above them. 8.2 GW of pipeline has no dated COD and is not in the bands. Targets here are sub-national (7) — no single national line to draw.
How this line is made
The Expected Buildout line answers one question: of the pipeline announced today, how much actually gets built, and when? It is not a scenario and not a target tracker — it is the database's live pipeline, passed through two filters measured from the industry's own delivery record.
Whether a project completes. Every project in development carries a completion weight, banded Delivering / Expected / Prospective / Fragile. A proposal — a site where no authority has yet granted rights — carries none and sits outside this line entirely; it is listed, not counted. The starting point is the historical completion rate of its lifecycle stage — of projects that reached construction, 97% delivered; financed but not yet building, 92%; consented without financing, 75%; early development, 61%; on hold, 15%. That base rate is then adjusted by what the project has actually secured (offtake, grid, consents, investment decision) and decays if a project sits quiet past its stage's normal dwell time.
When it delivers. Each project also carries a completion-date distribution — a shape, not a single year, right-skewed because offshore wind slips late far more often than it runs early. The peak sits on a rule-based expected date chained from the project's latest achieved milestone; the width of the late tail is fitted to how far past their announced dates real projects actually landed: builders slip tight (68% on time, n=158), financed projects tighter still (72%, n=101), consented-only projects carry the fat tail — 25% land three or more years late (n=133). A stated date faster than any comparable project has ever achieved is floored to the achievable window and flagged, never taken at face value.
The line is the sum, across every live project, of capacity × completion weight × the probability it delivers in each year. For projects already under construction, a share of expected capacity is counted at first power — turbines start generating before a wind farm is fully commissioned — so a market's chart can show capacity arriving a year before a project's stated completion date. Delivered history is metered fact; the line inherits every assumption above and nothing else.
Honest limits. The weights are calibrated on a fleet whose failures have so far been overwhelmingly pre-financing — completion rates after FID rest on a record with few failures, so they are ceilings, not guarantees. The slip fitted on consented projects is the loosest (the "three or more years late" bucket spans many years). Policy shocks arrive faster than base rates move — the weights see a stop-work order only as its lifecycle consequences accrue. And the line redistributes as the database learns: it is re-derived on every data refresh, not frozen.
Full per-project workings — each project's weight, band, expected date and distribution — are on its project page. Calibration v2.0-phase0 · generated 2026-09-09; every figure above is read from the generated calibration file, never typed.
Auction outlook
forecast · 9 rounds trackedNew York's fifth solicitation (launched July 2024) was terminated without award on 13 February 2026, NYSERDA citing "federal actions disrupting the offshore wind market". NY6 is design/RFI-stage only — no date. Aspirational, not scheduled.
The MA/RI/CT MOU (Oct 2023) created the first US multi-state OSW procurement pathway; the 2024 round delivered the largest New England selection ever (MA + RI, Sept 2024; ~2,678 MW) but CT sat out. No next coordinated round is scheduled; regional appetite suppressed by the federal pause.
The 2023 POWER Act set an 8.5 GW-by-2031 goal and directed MPSC/PJM transmission work. New generation procurement beyond awarded ORECs is unscheduled and exposed to the federal pause and to risk around US Wind's Maryland lease/permits.
California is floating (Pacific) and depends on FEDERAL leases (Humboldt/Morro Bay, leased Dec 2022) plus the AB 1373 central-procurement mechanism (Oct 2023). No procurement solicitation has launched, and the federal permitting pause / WEA risk threatens the underlying leases. The 7,600 MW is a need determination, not a scheduled auction.
NJ's FOURTH solicitation was CANCELLED (no award) on 3 Feb 2025 — Shell exited Atlantic Shores (~$1bn writedown), bidders withdrew, federal uncertainty cited. No 5th solicitation launched or scheduled as of mid-2026. Placeholder year is nominal only.
Originally scheduled Oct 2024, BOEM postponed for insufficient bidder interest; the administration then RESCINDED the Oregon Wind Energy Area (Jul 2025) amid de-designation of >3.5m acres of WEAs. Effectively cancelled — a re-attempt would require re-designating a WEA.
A second Central Atlantic sale was on the Biden-era schedule (~2026) after Central Atlantic 1 (Aug 2024). Under the Jan 2025 pause, scheduled 2025-26 sales were halted and the 5-year-schedule requirement eliminated (5 Aug 2025). No longer on any official calendar.
The first Gulf of Maine sale was held on 29 October 2024. No further round is scheduled: the five-year leasing-schedule requirement was eliminated (5 August 2025) and unleased wind-energy-area acreage de-designated.
A second New York Bight sale was indicatively scheduled (~2027) after the record Feb 2022 sale ($4.37bn). Now indefinite: 5-year schedule requirement eliminated (Aug 2025) and unleased acreage de-designated.